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( APPENDIX c ) 
STATE, PLAINTIFF, V. CHILTON, DEFENDANT 
STATE, PLAINTIFF, V. TERRY, DEFENDANT 
COMMON PLEAS COURT, CUYAHOGA COUNTY 
Nos. 7 9 4 3 2, 79491. Decided September 22, 1964. 
ARREST (Abs & O. Jur. 2d)z 
1. When a police officer stops a person for interrogation 
i! because of suspicious conduct and 11frisks 11 him, by patting the out-
side of his clothing, solely to determine, for the safety of the officer, 
whether the person stopped is carrying a weapon, there has not been 
an arrest prior to the frisk. 
EVIDENCE (Abs & O. Jur. 2d) - 189 
SEARCH & SEIZURE (Abs & 0. Jur. 2d) - 8 
2. A state may establish its own rules and standards per-
taining to search and seizure so long as these rules and standards do 
not violate the substance and spirit of the Fourth Amendment. 
WEAPONS (Abs & O. Jur. 2d) - 11 
3. The frisking by a police officer of a person stopped for 
interrogation because of suspicious conduct is proper to meet the prac-
tical demands of effective criminal investigation and the safety of the 
officer, and admissionas evidence of the fruit of the frisk in a pros-
ecution for carrying concealed weapons does not violate the de£endant 1 s 
rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
HEADNOTES BY EDITORIAL STAFF. 
Mr. John T. Corrigan, county prosecutor, by Mr. Reuben Payne, 
assistant county prosecutor, for the State. 
Mr. Louis Stokes, for defendants. 
History : -- Motion to suppressevidence in prosecution for carrying 
con_cealed weapons. Motion overruled. For further history see 
Omnibus Index in bound volume. 
Friedman, J. Gentlemen, it was suggested yesterday that 
briefs be filed and I stated that it was not necessary, in light of the 
fact that I have given this matter considerable attention as to the law, 
and the only question before me was to determine the facts so the 
proper lawcan be applied. 
There is no question about the facts in this case, so I don't 
think it is necessary for me to repeat at length save and except tostate 
that the police officer of many years of service and experience had 
observed the action of the defendants which indicated to him that they were 
casing a robbery. 
There is. no doubtin my mind that the officer, based upon 
his training, length of service, and experience as a police officer 
and detective, assigned in the area which he had been placed, and 
doing the job he had been doing, had reasonable cause to believe and 
to suspect that the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously
and some interrogation should be made of their action. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has in many cases 
of recent years expressed itself clearly and distinctly that a general
search and seizure is in violation of the Fourth Amendment unless the 
search is done with a proper warrant from the court, or if the search 
is made in connection with a lawful arrest and is contemporaneous and 
incidental to such arrest. Henry v. u. S., 361 U.S., 98 4L Ed. (2d), 
134. Ker v. California, 374 U.S., 23, 10 L Ed. {2d), 726. Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S., 643, 6 L Ed. (2D) 1081. 
There is noevidence that any warrant had been is sued for 
a search or frisk and I am not going to stretch the facts and say that 
there was a lawful arrest prior to the frisk of the defendants. I be-
lieve it would be stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehen-
sion and foolhardy to say there was .a lawful arrest, because there 
wasn't, from the facts as presented. 
It has been frequently stated by the U.S. Supreme Court 
. that a state may establish its own rules and standards pertaining 
to sear.ch and seizure so long as these rules .and standards do not 
violate the substance and spirit of the Fourth Amendment. It would 
certainly follow that the same rule would apply to the problem of 
11 stopping and frisking 11 of an individual by a police officer where 
the facts justify. 
[i 
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He merely tapped them about the outer part OF their bodies 
to determinei£ they had any weapons or guns, forhis own personal 
protection, and by doing so he discovered that two of the three in-
dividuals had concealed guns, and the guns are the fruit of the frisk, 
and not of a search. 
In the case of People v Rivera (7/10/64) f 64} decided by New 
York Court of Appeals, 33 u. S. Law Week, 2044 July 28, 1964, the 
court state thata policeman has the authority to stop and question 
a suspect.· 11 Prompt inquiry into suspicious or unusual conduct is 
anindispensable power in the orderly goverment of a large urban 
communities. 11 
The frisk is essential to the stop for without the latter 
the answer to the police officer may be a bullet, and a loaded 
pistol discovered during the frisk is admissible .
In the case of People v Martin, 46 Cal. (2d) 106, the court 
similarlyupheld stop and frisk by an officer, and the court in effect 
stated the security of public order and lives of the police are to be 
weighed against a minorinconvenience and petty indignity. 
I may say at this time, I am a great believer of the per-
personal rights propounded by our Supreme Court, reiterated and re-
affirmed, neglected over the years, and given to us under the Fourth 
Amendment; and other amendments of the U. S. and State Constitutions. 
But police officers in a community also have rights under 
theconstitution, and rights given to them by virtue of their office, 
and one of their rights as I have indicated is the right when the cir-
cumstances justify and there is a reasonable suspicion, and for his 
ow:n personal protection, to stop the individual or individuals and not 
search, butto frisk, to determine if there are weapons for his own 
personal safety ; and finding the weapon by frisking is the fruit of 
the stop and_ frisk, in the same relation that the courts refer to the 
fruits of the .crime on a search and seizure. Ballard v State, 43 
Ohio St., 340 ; Clark v DeWalt, 65 Ohio Law Abs., 193, 203. 
I believe that I reiterate again that search and seizure 
law .cannot be applied in this particular case, although Mr. Reuben 
Payne endeavored to show there was a lawful arrest, but the Court 
·cannot agree. If there was an arrest it came subsequentto the frisk. 
But as I have stated, and I repeatagain, there is a distinc-
tion between a frisk and a search and seizure .
l 
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In the case of Ker v California, 374 U.S., 323, 10 L .Ed 
(2d) 726, the court pronounced : 11 A state is not precluded from 
: developingworkable rules governing searches to meet the practical 
demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement 
that does notviolate the constitutional standards of what is reason-
able search and seizure". 
Our courts in Ohio have on many occasions expressed that 
· a police officer has the right to stop a suspicious person for the pur-
pose of interrogation. Therefore, can it be said that the frisking of 
said person by the officer for the: purpose of his own safety is a stand-
ard setby our state that is violative of the Fourth Amendment, or is 
it a proper guidance to meet the practical demands of effective crim-
inal investigatioh and the safety of the officer performing his sworn 
duty ? This Court believes that it is the latter view that wouldbe 
prevaiiing and that such conduct would not be held as a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
We cannot forego and forget that police officers have a job 
to do, and they must do the job in connection with crime which has 
been on the increase. 
At the sametime a police officer cannot - - as far as this 
Court is concerned - - and will not be permitted to stop and frisk 
an individual simply because he has a suspicion, a mere suspicion, 
unless they are reasonable circumstancesjustifying a frisk. 
This Court believes there is a distinction between stopping 
and frisking, and search and seizure. 
A search is primarily for the purpose of trying to obtain 
evidence in connection with the corn:mission of a crime, that the 
police officer may reasonably believe that a crime has been com-
mitted or might be committed. 
A frisking is strictly for the protection of the officer's 
person andhis life. 
There was reasonable cause in this case for the officer, 
Detective McFadden, to approach these individuals and pat them. 
Heapproached them, and for his own protection frisked them. He 
did not go into their pockets. Had he gone into thei:r pockets and 
obtained evidence, as an example, .narcotics or illegal slips, there 







This matter is of great importance and of great concern, and 
I certainly hope that counsel will endeavor to have this question deter-
mined by the Appellate Courts, for it is most desirable that we have 
clearness with respect to this problem and that the police officers 
know what they may do and can do in a stop and frisk matter. 
The motion in each case is overruled, and exception to the 
defendants. It is so ordered .
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